| Document |
Person
/ Dpt |
Title |
Key
point(s) |
| The
Iraq options paper |
Overseas
and Defense Secretariat, Cabinet Office
|
Iraq:
Options Paper
March 8, 2002
|
"Continue
to make clear (without overtly espousing regime
change) our view that Iraq would be better off
without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future
for Iraq without him in a 'Contract with the
Iraqi people' [...]" |
| Building
an Iraq legal case |
Legal
advisors of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
Iraq:
Legal Background
March 8, 2002 |
"In
the UK's view a violation of Iraq's obligations
which undermines the basis of the cease-fire
[...] can revive the authorization to use force
[...]. The US [...] maintains that the assessment
of breach is for individual member States. We
are not aware of any other State which supports
this view." |
| Condi
pledged regime change in 2002 |
David
Manning, Blair foreign policy advisor |
Letter
to the Prime Minister on dinner with Condoleezza
Rice
March 14, 2002 |
"I
said that you would not budge in your support
for regime change but you had to manage a
press, a Parliament and a public opinion [...]"
"Condi
[Rice]'s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed."
"Bush
has yet to find the answers to the big questions:
[...] what happens on the morning after?"
|
| British
ambassador: 'The need to wrongfoot Saddam
on the inspectors' |
Christopher
Meyer, UK ambassador to the U.S. |
Note
on Sunday lunch with Paul Wolfowitz, to David
Manning |
"We
backed regime change, but the plan had to
be clever and failure was not an option. It
would be a tough sell for us domestically,
and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe."
"…As
the conversation developed, it became clear
that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not.
He said that [Chalabi] had a good record in
bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq.
The CIA stubbornly refused to recognize this.
They unreasonably denigrated the INC because
of their fixation with Chalabi."
|
| Brits
knew Iraq WMD program stalled |
Peter
Ricketts, Blair political advisor |
Letter
to Jack Straw
March 22, 2002 |
"For
Iraq, "regime change" does not stack up. It
sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam.
Much better, as you have suggested, to make
the objective ending the threat to the international
community from Iraqi WMD [...]." |
| Foreign
Secretary indicates Britain knew Iraq case weak |
Jack
Straw, British Foreign Secretary |
Letter
to the Prime Minister
March 25, 2002 |
"We
have also to answer the big question - what
will this action achieve? There seems to be
a larger hole in this than on anything. Most
of the assessments from the US have assumed
regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's
WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered
how that regime change is to be secured, and
how there can be any certainty that the replacement
regime will be better." |
